Saturday, November 20, 2010
Blog #11
The experiment regarding merchants and the role(s) they play in the economy was very interesting regarding the implicit and explicit communication that went on between not only the villagers themselves, but amongst the merchants as well. From mine and Brent’s role as producers and merchants, I feel we were better able to experience the full spectrum of exchange and cooperation, both implicit and explicit. For example, even though it took us a bit of time to find the correct production specialization and a suitable trading partner, once these tasks were accomplished we were able to take excess producer inventory to the merchant market and once there exchange these blue goods for the most pink goods we could obtain. However, we did not explicitly tell our producing partner we were going to take the excess inventory, nor did we tell them how we would (or even if we would) distribute the pink goods upon our return to the village. This type of non-verbal implicit communication could have been due to the fact that test subjects are immediately grouped into a cyber “villages” and when individuals are initially classified as a village, to me there is a certain amount of obligation to the group as a whole for ensuring favorable outcomes for your fellow “villagers”. This village atmosphere could then contribute to a strong in-group affiliation resulting in the lack of specific and explicit communication among villagers, and yet lead to favorable gains for trading partners within the villages. Like I said, as I recall neither Brent nor myself at any time imparted information to our partner regarding the excess blue inventory, but our partner was able to see this action through the declining balance in their field. Upon our return from the merchant area, this trust was rewarded by the equal split of the pink goods. I suppose we could have negotiated regarding the division of the pink goods, but I don’t think it would have been advantageous for Brent or I seeing that it was excess producer inventory that was used to acquire the pink goods in the first place. This could have provided motivation for our not attempting negotiation, but I believe the desire to fairly compensate our producer ally was the prime reason for the equitable division of the pink goods. Additionally, as I recall when we returned from the merchant area with the pink goods, our producer partner did not even inquire regarding the terms of the trade between us (Brent and I) and our merchant partner. This would seem out of step with a real-world transaction of this sort because it seems that nowadays nobody would give anyone who was not a blood relative charge over valuable goods without an expressed written agreement specifically outlining terms, conditions, and penalties for failure to comply with the contract. This lack of formality in the village area could in part be explained by our classroom association. As a whole our class could be somewhat viewed as an in-group prior to the assigning of the “village” term and the associated obligations that implicitly and instinctually go along with that association. When the word instinct comes into play regarding this experiment, I wonder if somehow the merchant acted as a type of physical facilitator to bridge, as Hayek puts it, the gap between “instinct and reason”. Hayek claims that cultural evolution (custom and tradition) lies between instinct and reason, and I wonder if one can view the merchant area (with its much more formal and impersonal exchanges) as a result of the implementation of man’s reason then this kind analogy kind of makes sense. In any event, the experiment was excellent insofar that it illuminated the merchant’s role(s) in an extended order.
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2 comments:
I agree with David, it does seem odd that the producer we were trading with did not question our actions or request that a specified number of pinks be given back to her. It does seem unusual, because in the real world I, along with a majority of people, would be hesitant to be so trusting in someone whom I had an impersonal relationship with. I agree that our group dynamic must have had an impact on our relationship - if the producer knows that we are conscious of the long-term benefits of maintaining a relationship they are bound to be more trusting. I feel that there was another variable that was contributing to our trusting relationship.
In the experiment we had a limited number of producers we could work with - two - and since there was an equivalent number of producers to merchants, we had a limited selection of producers to choose to trade with. This inability to efficiently and easily change producers lowered the opportunity cost; thus, we never changed producers through out the entire experiment. I believe that if the number of producers heavily outweighed the number of merchants, producers would have more issues trusting merchants. This would be due to the merchants' ability to change producers, essentially creating one-shot relationships between the two. Of course, bad mouthing and gossip may be two methods for producers to counter act the lack of “integrity” in merchants; however, with the competition of getting a merchant to trade with, there would bound to be a producer willing to join into an unfavorable relationship.
I feel that this scenario of producers outweighing merchants is more common in real markets. For instance, there is the beverage market is saturated with a variety of producers, but only several major distributors (Cocoa-Cola Enterprises, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., Pepsi Bottling Group). If this is scenario of markets saturated with producers is true in real markets, then there would be a loss of trust and integrity, and thus a loss in market efficiencies. If the issue of trust and integrity has such a large effect on market productivity, then it is important to maintain the status quo in relationships between producers and merchants. If there are saturated markets how does a producer lower merchants’ opportunity costs?
The only rational solution I have to this issue is that in this scenario producers would have to be willing to forfeit some of their possible gains to the merchants. At this point in the relationship trust is not the key, but appeasing the other party and being concerned for their welfare is the necessary ingredient to maximizing the long-term profits of the producer.
I was also a merchant and was able to experience a broader view of the experiment. I felt like the merchants were in an advantageous position because of their ability to exchange for the multiplier good and because of their exclusive knowledge of how the merchant market operated. But it seems like our villages operated very differently
Our village quickly realized how to maximize within our own village using specialization and trade. It happened so quickly that by the third round I got antsy and had to explore the possibilities of the merchant market. I did this without communicating much with the other members of my village. It took a few rounds of production to find a stable trading partner, and during this time some members of my village seemed to be upset by the fact that the merchant market became my priority.
During this time I traded the excess from my own production of pink units for the other villages blue. Initially I was acting alone; I did not receive any additional units to trade in the merchant market from the others in my village. And since I owed nothing to any members of my village, I was able to keep all of the blue units for myself. For a while there was no discussion about the blue units, and then one of the members of my village offered me his additional units for trade in the merchant market. There was no specific talk of what his return would be, he was acting blindly expecting me to act in his best interest. I was able to establish a routine exchange with him, one where he was unaware of what the real trade costs were. He was the only other villager who received any of the blue units I traded for in the merchant market. The other members of my village never inquired about the blue units, and I felt no obligation to distribute the units among them.
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