Sunday, October 05, 2008

Adam Smith Explains It All- Family Edition

In Part VI, Section II of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith outlines a hierarchy of love. Oddly enough, it contains a rough approximation of the history of moral sentiment. His hierarchy is as follows:

1. One's self

2. Children

3. Siblings

4. Nieces and nephews

5. Second cousins

6. The elderly

1. It is fitting that he would place self so highly, as self-interest is at the core of most of Smith's assertions. However, this prioritization carries over through post-Adam Smith thought on this issue. Ridley states that altruism had been redefined into a method of foresighted selfishness, and that this mode of thought carried on into the twentieth century.

2. By putting children second, Smith is reinforcing his principles of self-interest, as children are the closest possible extension of one's self. However, children represent another conception of moral sentiments. Dawkins' "selfish gene" hypothesis would put children first. If people are merely vessels for selfishly replicating strands of protein and sugar, then the fruits of reproduction would be most worthy of affection.

3-5. Smith states, "After himself, the members of his own family, those who usualy live in the same house with him...are naturally the objects of his warmest affetions. They naturally and usually are persons upon whose happiness or misery his conduct must have the greatest influence." Though Smith extends the warmth of familial affection to apparently obscure family members (I don't care much for my second cousins), he is again asserting that love for relatives is a reflection of love for one's self. This could also connect to Dawkins' hypothesis.

6. Though what he is saying is technically true, Smith's points on the elderly seem somewhat appalling. "In ordinary cases, an old man dies without being much regretted by any body." Caring for the elderly does not fit into Smith's idea of pure self-interest, and it certainly does not suit Dawkins' scenario of protecting future generations. It does, however, fit Frank's reevaluation of altruism. In The Origins of Virtue, it states that "the virtuous are virtuous for no other reason than that it enables them to join forces with others who are virtuous, to mutual benefit." Caring for the old is not logical, but neither is giving blood or mentoring children. All of these activities inspire, as Ridley says, a sort of awe at the kindheartedness of the individual. By appearing altruistic, people open themselves up to new connections and resources.

0 comments: